Bertola/Caballero (1994) and Abel/Eberly (1996) extended Jorgenson's classical model of …rms'optimal investment. By introducing investment frictions, they were able to capture the role of future anticipations in investment decisions as well as the lumpy and intermittent nature of investment dynamics. We extend Jorgenson's model to the other direction of …nancing frictions. We construct a model of an equity-only …rm, who must pay a linear …nancing cost for issuing new shares. We show that the …rm's optimal investment-…nancing is a two-trigger policy in which the …rm …nances investment by issuing new shares (supplementing internal funds) when the shadow price of capital hits the upper trigger value. When the shadow price hits the lower trigger value, she sells a portion of her capital stock and buys back shares (or pays dividends). Values of the shadow price of capital between the two trigger values de…ne a range of "inaction", in which the …rm does neither issue nor buy back shares and invests all of her internal funds for expansion.
Introduction
Frictions are the primary theme of the theory of the …rm and corporate …-nance. In the past four decades, there has been a ‡ood of theoretical as well as empirical studies on how investment frictions in ‡uence the dynamics of corporate investments. In contrast, how …nancing frictions in ‡uence corporate dynamics is a recent topic of research and has been studied mostly via numerical approach which provides realistic but intractable analysis.
Jorgenson's formulation of a dynamic investment problem (Jorgenson (1963) ) is where our construction starts. In his classical model the …rm can adjust her capital stock without any frictions, and this absence of frictions makes …rm's optimal investment policy to be a purely static one in which the marginal product of capital equals the user cost of capital.
The …rm's decision becomes a truly dynamic problem, in which anticipations about the future economic environment a¤ect current decisions when frictions prevent instantaneous and costless adjustment of the capital stock. Bertola and Caballero (1994) introduced "irreversibility" of investment in the sense that the …rm cannot sell its capital stock. This is equivalent to assuming that the selling price of capital is zero. Abel and Eberly (1996) generalized this model to the case of "costly reversibility"; namely the …rm can sell its capital stock but at a price less than the purchase price. They were successful in showing that frictions are the source of nonlinear and intermittent investment dynamics 1 . In this paper, we pursue the other direction of introducing …nancing frictions to Jorgenson's model. "Irreversibility" in our model means that the …rm may return cash to stockholders by paying dividends or buying back shares but cannot obtain additional cash from stockholders by issuing new shares 2 . "Costly reversibility" means that the …rm can …nance externally but at some cost 3 . Readers will see that our development goes very much 1 Nonlinear adjustment cost incurred upon changing production capacity is another source of investment frictions. This idea originates in Uzawa's "Penrose curve" (Uzawa (1969) ). There is again an ample literature on this topic including Mussa (1977) , Abel (1983) and Hayashi (1982) . See Abel and Eberly (1994) for a uni…cation of both approaches. In this paper we do not assume the adjustment cost of investment (nor any form of investment frictions) in order to focus solely on the impact of …nancing frictions. 2 Neglecting taxation dividends and share repurchase are equivalent in our model. We will use these terms interchangeably, but will mostly use "buying back shares" instead of "dividends" to contrast it to "issuing new shares". 3 We do not explicitly model asymmmetic information and/or di¤erential taxation to in parallel with the irreversible investment literature. Yet, by introducing …nancial frictions our formulation naturally includes …nancing decisions as well as investment decisions, which is in contrast to the optimal investment literature. In this regard, the benchmark Jorgensonian model may as well be called the Modigliani-Miller model in our context. We construct a model of an equity-only …rm who must pay a linear …nanc-ing cost for issuing new shares. We show that the …rm's optimal investment…nancing is a two-trigger policy in which the …rm …nances its investment by issuing new shares (supplementing internal funds) when the shadow price of capital hits the upper trigger value. When the shadow price hits the lower trigger value, she sells a portion of her capital stock and buys back shares (or pays dividends). Values of the shadow price of capital between the two trigger values de…ne a range of "inaction", in which the …rm does neither issue nor buy back shares and invests all of her internal funds for expansion. Analytically we work on the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to characterize the optimal investment and …nancing policy. We will show that …nancial frictions force the shadow price of capital to satisfy a second-order ordinary linear di¤erential equation, which is dual to the one generated by investment frictions.
Vast amount of researches has been done to study how …nancial constraints and …nancial frictions a¤ect corporate behavior. But most of them are empirical and only a handful of papers formulate the …rm's investment and …nancing decisions as a stochastic dynamic optimization problem. Whited (2006) and Whited (2005, 2007) are most closely related to ours in this regard. Using a discrete-time formulation their interest is to provide a model which produces lumpy and intermittent corporate investments most consistent with reality. Thus their models include such factors as taxation, bankruptcy costs, endogenous defaults, endogenous borrowing rate of interest, and nonlinear equity-issuance costs. However, relying on numerical computation to solve the dynamic optimization problem, the characterization of the optimal investment/…nancing policy is imperfect and theoretical insights are limited.
As stated in footnote 1 we avoid the introduction of nonlinear adjustment cost of investment. These authors share the same spirit, except that Whited (2006) investigates how lumpy investment behavior depends on nonconvex endogenize these costs. This is because we want to investigate analytically the impact of these costs on corporate investment and …nancing decisions in the simplest setting.
physical adjustment cost and the presence of …nancial constraints.
A latest working paper by Bolton, Chen and Wang (2009) is more in line with ours in that they analytically derive the nature of the optimal policy 4 . Their model includes a wider set of corporate decisions than ours such as cash management and default decisions. On the other hand they work on a revenue function which is proportional to capital, whence nonlinear capital adjustment cost is essential for their formulation. This aspect of their model considerably restricts the generality and depth of their theoretical inquiry.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the Jorgenson's model in a format that serves as a benchmark to our considerations. In section 3 we present the analysis of "irreversible investment" and then proceed to the case of "costly reversible investment". We will provide a more straightforward derivation of the optimal policy for the latter case. In section 4 we present a model with "irreversible …nancing". Section 5 extends the analysis to the case of "costly reversible …nancing". In section 6 we compute the optimal investment and …nancing policy numerically by the value-iteration algorithm and show graphically a typical path of the capital stock corresponding to each case. In this paper we assume that the exogenous process driving the market and technological conditions follows a geometric Brownian motion. This technical assumption reduces the problem to one with a single state variable. Section 7 shows how one can extend the model to re ‡ect changing growth-rate, which expands the problem to a two-dimensional state space. Section 8 concludes the paper and proposes additional directions of extending this research.
The Classical Jorgensonian Model of Investment
We extend Jorgenson's classical model of investment to a stochastic environment. We also provide an alternative formulation, which is more suited to analyze the in ‡uence of …nancial constraints. He showed that when a …rm can adjust its capital stock without any frictions its optimal investment policy is a static decision in which the construct called the user cost of capital is the key variable a¤ecting investment.
Firm' s optimization problem
Consider a …rm who uses capital stock K t to produce output. The …rm's instantaneous operating cash ‡ow is given by
where Z t denotes a random shock which represents the business conditions facing the …rm such as strength of demand, costs of inputs and …rm's productivity. The speci…cation in (1) can be derived if …rm's production and demand functions have constant elasticity. Assume that fZ t g follows a geometric Brownian motion
where and are constants and fW t g is a standard Wiener process. Capital can be purchased and sold at a constant unit price P 5 . The capital stock depreciates at a constant proportional rate 0, so the capital stock evolves according to
in which fG t g denotes the cumulative gross investment process 6 . At this stage the increments fdG t g is unconstrained in sign; i.e., investments are reversible.
Assume that the …rm maximizes the market value of the …rm which is de…ned as the expected present value of net cash ‡ows (free cash ‡ows) discounted at a constant positive rate r 7 . The market value of the …rm is
5 We can obviously assume that the price of capital stock also moves randomly. We suppress this generality to focus attention on the fundamental nature of the optimal decisions. 6 Formally, let f ; F; P g be a …ltered probability space supporting a Brownian motion fW t g where F = fF t g and F t represents the augmented …ltration generated by all the information up to time t. We assume that fG t g is adapted to F. All the decision variables in subsequent sections are assumed to be adapted to F. 7 To keep the generality of the model one can either assume that r is a riskless rate of interest and the expectation is taken under the risk-neutral probability measure or that r is a risk-adjusted rate and the expectation is taken under the natural probability measure.
Since G t is not di¤erentiable, the second term in (4) is to be interpreted as Itô integral. As usual the subscript of the expectation operator indicates timing of the information with which the conditional expectation is taken.
The valuation (4) re ‡ects the cash ‡ow discount formula. We can transform this to the dividend discount formula as follows. Denote the cumulative dividend process by fD t g. Again we have no sign restriction on fdD t g at this stage, so that dD t < 0 means negative dividends; i.e., …nancing by issuing new shares. At each date we have the budget equation
Using (5) the valuation formula (4) is rewritten as
In this section we need to use (4) as we will be focusing on the investment constraints such as dG t 0. In section 3 and 4 we will need to work on (6) as we will focus on the …nancing constraints such as dD t 0. Note that a choice of investment policy fG t g implies a corresponding choice of …nancing policy fdD t g and vice versa 8 .
Optimal investment policy under no frictions
Inserting (3) for dG t into (4) and integrating by parts, one can translate the problem into a maximization problem with respect to fK t g:
This valuation formula shows that the market value of the …rm consists of (i) the physical value of the capital stock on hand and (ii) the value created by using the capital stock for business activities. The contribution in the second term during a small time interval (t; t + t) is the operating cash ‡ow, (K t Z t ) t; in excess of Jorgenson's "user cost of capital", (r + ) P K t t. Jorgenson de…nes the user cost of capital as the opportunity cost of carrying a stock of progressively depreciating capital 9 . Alternatively it is the accounting earnings, (K t Z t P K t ) t; in excess of the required return on capital, (P K t ) r t. It is worth noting that this simple "residual income" valuation formula holds only under the assumption of no frictions in investment and …nancing.
The right hand side of (7) reveals that the …rm's maximization problem reduces to a static problem of choosing the capacity K t at each date which maximizes the periodical residual income. The …rst-order condition for K t is
The …rm is best served by the myopic rule of setting the marginal revenue product of capital equal to the user cost of capital at every instance of time. Solving (8) the optimal frictionless capital stock is given by the rule
Inserting this result back to (7) and carrying out the stochastic integration, we …nd that the optimal value of the …rm at time t is given by
where
Note that the integral in (7) converges if
Remark 1 Check this formula as Bertola's equation (9) has a minus sign.
Budget equation (5) dictates how the investment is …nanced. If K t Z t t < G t the di¤erence is …nanced by issuing shares, whereas if K t Z t t > G t the excess cash ‡ow is paid as dividends.
Remark 2 Optimal investment dictates …nancing in section 2 and 3. Optimal …nancing dictates investments in section 4. In paper 2 with banks we return to the former relationship even with …nancial frictions.
The Model With Investment Frictions
In this section we summarize the analysis provided by Bertola and Caballero (1994) for the case of irreversible investments. We then proceed for the case of costly reversible investments. Both cases allow closed form solutions for the optimal investment policy. We will provide a more straightforward derivation of the optimal policy on costly reversibility than was o¤ered by Abel and Eberly (1996) .
Irreversible investments
Irreversible investment can be characterized by the constraint dG t 0. We use the dynamic programming to solve this problem.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of this problem takes the form
in which
The left-hand side of equation (13) is the required return on the …rm. The right-hand side of (13) is the maximized expected return consisting of net cash ‡ow plus the expected change in the value of …rm. Using Itô's lemma we obtain
The inequality dG t 0 requires the complementary slackness condition
This implies that the shadow price of capital, or the marginal valuation of capital, should never be allowed to exceed its price P . Adopting this condition (14) reduces to
Since this equation holds identically along the optimal path, and can be di¤erentiated term-by-term with respect to K t , taking the partial derivatives of both sides of (16) by K t yields
De…ning the shadow price of capital by
is
It turns out that
Expressing v (K; Z) q (y) the partial di¤erential equation (18) becomes an ordinary di¤erential equation of the form
In addition to satisfying the di¤erential equation (20), q (y) must satisfy the boundary conditions. Optimal investment is zero when the shadow price of capital, q (y) ; is less than the price of the capital stock P . Condition (15) requires that the …rm should undertake positive gross investment only if q (y) reaches P . The trigger value of y, which we denote by y G , is given by the smooth-pasting condition q (y G ) = P
and the high-contact condition Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the shadow price, q (y), corresponding to the optimal solution 10 . The complementary slackness condition (15) requires that the optimal policy should prevent q (y) from ever exceeding P and should involve no gross investment, dG t = 0, until q (y) reaches the triggered value P . The latter requirement generates the di¤erential equation (20). The smooth-pasting condition guarantees that if the boundary is reached at time t, the shadow price of capital, i.e., the value of additional unit of capital stock, will equal its cost, P . The high-contact condition ensures that the shadow price of capital does not change when investment is non-zero 11 .
Figure 1. Shadow price of capital (irreversible investment)
The optimal frictionless capital stock was given by the function K J (Z t ) ; only dependent on the prevailing business condition, Z t . In contrast, if the investment is irreversible, the optimal capital stock becomes history-dependent. Figure 2 illustrates the …rm's optimal investment policy. Using the trigger value, y G ; de…ne function
Denote the currently installed capital stock by K and the let Z denote the unique solution to K G (Z ) = K . Then the optimal investment is given by the following rule: . If Z t > Z invest immediately so as to obtain K t = K G (Z t ); otherwise K t should be allowed to depreciate. The condition Z t > Z re ‡ects an insu¢ cient capital: The installed capital is too small relative to the …rm's anticipation of the current and future business conditions 12 . The …rm …nd herself stuck with excessive stock of capital when Z t < Z . 
and 1 ; 2 are the roots of the characteristic equation
Since r + > 0 this quadratic equation has two roots of opposite sign. Since Z = 0 is absorbing for the fZ(t)g process, it must be the case that lim y!0 q(y) = 0, to imply that only the positive root need be considered. Accordingly, we have
where and is the positive root of (26), and B is a constant of integration. Note that > 1 can be easily shown from (26) as (12) holds by assumption. As shown in Appendix A, the solution of (B; y G ) that satisfy (21) and (22) turns out
From (23) the desired level of capital is given by
Since c r + , comparing (9) and (23) we …nd
with equality holding when = 0. The desired capital with irreversible investments is no larger than the optimal capital with reversibility. Intuitively, when capital once acquired cannot be resold again, the …rm should be more prudent in investment 13 . If = 0 and the …rm can perfectly anticipate the future, irreversibility plays no role and the optimal investment coincides with the frictionless case.
The shadow price of capital is given by
Integrating (33) the value of the …rm under the optimal investment policy is given by
Costly reversible investments
Costless reversible investment and irreversible investment are opposite ends of a spectrum in which there is costly reversibility. Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996) studied investment with costly reversibility by introducing a di¤erence between the purchase price and the sale price of capital. When investment is costly reversible, …rm's optimization problem is rede…ned as follows:
In this formulation fG t g denotes the cumulation of all purchases of capital and fC t g denotes the cumulation of all sales of capital up to time t. The increment dG t is restricted to be nonnegative, and the increment dC t is restricted to be nonpositive. The purchase price of capital, P U , and the sales price of capital, P L , are assumed to be constants. The wedge between the two prices could arise from transaction costs or from the …rm-speci…c nature of capital. This model includes the Jongenson's case (P U = P L ) and the irreversible investment case (P L = 0). The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation becomes
The inequality dC t 0 requires the complementary slackness condition
These conditions imply that max fdGt 0g (V K P U ) dG t = max fdCt 0g (V K P L ) dC t = 0. Applying these conditions to (35) we …nd that the shadow price of capital, q (y), should satisfy the same di¤erential equation (20) that we obtained for the case of irreversible investments. We also have
In this case the optimal investment policy becomes a two-trigger rule: buy capital when q (y) touches the level equal to P U ; sell capital when q (y) touches the level equal to P L ; no investment action when q (y) is between P U and P L . The values of y which trigger purchase of capital and sales of capital are denoted by y G and y C , respectively. These trigger values are determined by the smooth-pasting condition
and the high-contact condition Figure 3 exhibits the shape of q (y). Using the trigger values y G and y C de…ne functions
(39) Figure 4 illustrates the optimal investment policy. Let Z G denote the unique solution to K G Z G = K , in which K is the current capital stock. Similarly let Z C denote the unique solution to K C Z C = K . The optimal investment is given by the following rule: 
Then y G and y C are obtained by
where G y G =y C is the solution to
Abel and Eberly (1996) showed that even a tiny wedge between the purchase price and the sale price of capital produces a substantial range of inaction.
(44) Integrating (44) the value of the …rm under the optimal investment policy is given by
The Model With No External Financing
We now extend the foregoing analysis to the …rm's optimal investment subject to …nancial frictions. To contrast the impact of …nancial frictions upon …rm's investment to that of investment frictions we assume frinctionless investment, i.e., the …rm can purchase or sell the capital stock at a constant price, P . Assume that the …rm cannot …nance externally. She has the choice between earnings retention and dividends. All retained earnings are used to purchase capital stock. Thus investment decision is equivalent to dividend decision.
The decision problem is formulated as follows:
subject to (3) and 16 As in (34) the …rst term is the value of maintaining the current operation and the second term is the value of the growth option. The third term is the value of the abandonment option, i.e. the option to sell the capital stock in the future. Note that all terms are positive. In contrast, the marginal value of the second term in (44) is negative and the marginal value of the third term is positive. To verify these signs note that 0 < (G) < 1:
where fD t g denotes the cumulation of all dividends up to time t, which is restricted to have nonnegative increments (dD t 0). If we remove the nonnegativity constraint on fdD t g, we return to the Jorgenson's case. In this regard the Jorgenson's case is more properly called the Modigliani-Miller case. "Irreversibility" in …nancing means that the …rm may return cash to stockholders by paying dividends or buying back shares but cannot obtain additional cash from stockholders by issuing new shares. This …nancial constraint generates an optimal dynamic dividend policy which is nonlinear and path-dependent.
Solving the problem
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for this optimization problem is
Substituting (47) into (3) we can cancel the term dG t and get
Using Itô's lemma, we obtain
The inequality dD t 0 requires the complementary slackness condition
It enforces the shadow price of installed capital never to fall below the price of capital P . Adopting this condition the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation reduces to
=K, and q (y) v (K; Z) as before, we can derive the following equation for q (y) (see Appendix C for derivation):
This second-order linear di¤erential equation is very similar to (20), except that it is a homogeneous equation. On the other hand, the power function y 1 which was in the non-homogeneous term is now in the coe¢ cient of q 0 (y) and q (y). This prevents a closed-form expression for q (y).
The nature of optimal investment and dividend policy
The …rm cannot raise additional capital from her stockholders. This …nancial constraint motivates the …rm to store capital by restricting dividends. The complementary slackness condition (49) prevents q (y) from falling below P . Figure 5 illustrates the shape of q (y). The optimal dividend policy directs to pay dividends only when the shadow price drops to P . Otherwise, the …rm should grow by investing all of the earned income. Distributing dividends by selling one unit of capital stock (or by distributing earnings in an amount equal to buying one unit of capital stock) should be weighted against losing the marginal future income. If q (y) > P , the stockholders'opportunity cost of losing marginal future income outweights the bene…t of receiving dividends. The …rm should pay dividends only when q (y) = P . Let y div denote the value of y which triggers dividend payments. At this boundary we have the smooth-pasting condition
and the high-contact condition Figure 6 illustrates the …rm's optimal dividend and investment policy. Using the trigger value y div ; de…ne K div (Z t ) by
For the current installed capital stock, K , let Z denote the unique solution to K div (Z ) = K . Then the optimal decision rule is the following: If Z t > Z , retain all her earnings and invest in the capital stock; if Z t Z , sell capital stock and distribute the proceeds as dividends until
Note that in the case of Z t > Z the new level of capital stock may be above or below K div (Z t ), depending on the amount of the current income. It is when the …rm has an excessive capital stock (relative to the current and anticipated future business conditions) that the …rm should distribute returns to her stockholders. Since no closed-form solution is available we will show how the optimal policy operates by solving the stochastic dynamic programming problem numerically in section 6.
The Model With Costly Equity Finance
In this section we assume that the …rm can raise additional capital by issuing new shares. This assumption relaxes the assumption of irreversible …nancing. As illustrated in Introduction we assume that a …nancing cost of per dollar is incurred whenever the …rm …nances by issuing shares.
The …rm's optimization problem is given by
subject to (3) and
where fE t g denotes the cumulation of all equity …nance up to time t, which is restricted to have nonpositive increments (dE t 0). The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for this problem is
The inequality dD t 0 requires (49). The inequality dE t 0 requires
Adopting these conditions the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation reduces again to the di¤erential equation (51) for q (y). We also obtain the inequality
The nature of optimal investment and …nancing policy
When the …rm can raise capital by issuing new shares with issuing cost > 0, the optimal policy becomes a two-trigger rule: pay dividends (or repurchase shares) when q (y) touches the level equal to P ; issue new shares when q (y) touches the level equal to P= (1 ); no …nancing action when q (y) is between P and P= (1 ). Denote the trigger values by y div for dividend payments, and by y issue for issuing shares. These trigger values are determined by the boundary conditions (52), (53), and
as exhibited in Figure 7 . As in the previous section, if q (y) > P then the stockholders'opportunity cost of losing marginal future income outweights the bene…t of receiving dividends. If q (y) < P= (1 ), then increasing one unit of capital stock by issuing new shares will hurt the shareholders since the marginal contribution to the …rm value is lower than the shareholders'cash contributions per unit of capital. Thus the …rm should remain inactive in cashing-in or cashing-out the stockholders if the shadow price of capital is in (P; P= (1 )) : Figure 8 illustrates the …rm's optimal …nancing and investment policy. Together with
Let Z issue denote the unique solution to
which K is the current capital stock. The optimal decisions are given by the following rule: (i) If Z t > Z issue issue new shares to …nance investment immediately so as to obtain
and distribute the sales proceeds as dividends ;
issue there should be no external …nance nor dividend payouts and the …rm should invest all of the current income for capital expansion. Note that case (i) may involve no equity …nance if the current income is su¢ cient to realize K t = K issue (Z t ) : Figure 8 . Optimal …nancing policy (costly equity …nance)
When the …nancing cost = 0, we have the Jorgenson/Modigliani-Miller case. In this case (57) requires q (y) = P; 8y, i.e., the shadow price of capital always equals the price of capital stock. It is worth noting that if we substitute q 0 (y) q 00 (y) 0 into (51) we obtain
which coincides with (8) 17 . The two curves in Figure 8 collapses to a single curve, and it coincides with the Jorgenson's desired capital K J (Z t ). The capital should adjust immediately to this level independent of history. The amount of dividends or equity …nance is determined by such requirement. That is, …nancing decisions are completely subjected to the investment decisions if …nancing is frictionless.
De…ne the variable y J by
Comparing (61) with (28) we …nd that
holds. If investment is irreversible, the …rm has strong disincentive to overinvest. This is manifested in (62), or equivalently
We can extend this observation. If accessibility to the equity market for external …nancing is absent, the …rm has strong incentive to accumulate capital more than is necessary for producing goods to ful…ll the current demand. This intuition suggests the following inequality
or equivalently,
There is an alternative root to prove (62), by which we can also prove the inequality (63).
Recall the di¤erential equation (20) for q (y). As explained above the …rst term and the second term of the left-hand-side are both zero at y = y J . In contrast the …rst term is negative (q 00 (y G ) < 0 as one can see from Figure 1 ) and the second term is zero at y = y G . Observe that q (y J ) = P (Jorgensonian shadow price) and q (y G ) = P (the smooth-pasting condition), implying that 17 Naturally the same result obtains when we substitute q 0 (y) q 00 (y) 0 into (20).
the third term is identical at y J and y G . Using these properties one can easily show (63) by contradiction. Similarly on the di¤erential equation (51) we have q 00 (y div ) > 0 (see Figure  5 ), q 0 (y div ) = 0, and q (y div ) = P . From this we can prove the inequality (63) by contradiction.
Thus the inequality
follows.
Numerical Solution of the Problem
The models of Section 3 have closed-form solutions, but the models of section 4 and section 5 do not. Hence we solved all the stochastic dynamic programming problems numerically. Namely, we transformed the problem to a discrete-time, discrete-state Markov decision problem and used the method of value iteration to obtain the optimal solution 18 . We set the risk-free interest r = 5%, the depreciation rate = 10%; = 0:7; = 2% and = 2 =2. For the model of section 5 we set the equity issuance cost at = 1%. The algorithm produces the value function V (K ; Z) and the values of all decision variables at each node of (K; Z). We let ln (Z) to have 800 points of support in [ 100 ; 100 ]. The capital stock K lies in the set K; K (1 t) ; K (1 t) 2 ; :::; K (1 t) 500 ; where we set t = 0:2 and the maximum allowable capital stock, K; is determined by
in which Z is the maximum grid value of Z. We used Gauss-Hermite quadature to evaluate the conditional expectation of next period's …rm value in implementing the value iteration.
Irreversible Investment and Costly Reversible Investment Figure 9 . Typical investment path (irreversible investment and costly reversibility) Figure 9 exhibits a typical path of optimal capital stock when investment is costly reversible. The lower dotted line shows the path of K G (Z t ), the level of capital that triggers buying additional capital, while the upper dotted line shows the path of K C (Z t ), the level of capital that triggers selling capital. If the installed capital stock is strictly inside these trigger bounds, the …rm takes no investment action and the capital stock is left to depreciate. Note that these trigger bounds ‡uctuate according to the movement of Z t . The bold dotted line shows the optimal path of capital stock.
It is interesting and very much worth a formal proof that the level of buy trigger is independent of the selling price of capital stock 19 . This further implies that trigger level of buying capital, K G (Z t ), remains the same when we move to the case of irreversible investment. We superimpose the optimal solution for the irreversibility case on the same …gure. The straight line shows the optimal path of capital stock when investment is irreversible. The path of installed capital stock is higher for this case than when the case of costly 19 We believe that this is a fairly general property of optimization problems that involve two-sided trigger. We found no reference to this property in Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996) and in related literature. The proof is left to the readers. reversibility on occasions when costly reversibility enforces the …rm to sell capital.
No equity …nance and costly equity …nance Figure 10 . Typical investment path (no equity …nance and costly equity …nance) Figure 10 exhibits a typical path of capital stock when additional equity …nance is available but costly. Again the optimal strategy involves a trigger rule, but in this case an action means cash transactions between the …rm and the stockholders. The lower dotted line shows the path of K issue (Z t ), the level of capital that triggers issuing new shares, while the upper dotted line shows the path of K div (Z t ), the level of capital that triggers dividend payouts, or repurchase of shares. If the installed capital stock is strictly inside these trigger bounds, the …rm takes no …nancing action, which means that the …rm uses all internal funds for buying capital stock. The bold dotted line shows the optimal path of capital stock. Again we …nd that the level capital that triggers dividend payouts is independent of the equity …nancing cost, . This in turn implies that the level of capital that triggers dividend payouts, K div (Z t ), remains the same when we move to the case of no equity …nance. We superimpose this case of no equity …nance on the same …gure. In this case we have only the dividendtrigger as the …rm cannot issue shares. The straight line shows the optimal path of capital stock when equity …nance is unavailable. The path of installed capital stock is lower when equity …nance is unavailable than when it is available on occasions when the growing demand enforces the …rm to issue shares for further accumulation of capital.
A Model With Changing Growth Rate
We have worked with the assumption that the exogenous process Z t describing the business conditions ‡uctuates with constant expected rate of growth and constant volatility. In this section we propose an alternative model of Z t which may make our model more realistic.
Assume that fZ t g follows the process
in which t follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean-reverting process
where , and are constants and fW t g is a standard Brownian motion. The value of ( = ) is the long-run rate of growth and the parameter indicates the speed of adjustment in the mean-reversion:We only consider the case with investment irreversibility (dG t 0), i.e., the …rst model of Section 3. The extension of the following analysis to the other three cases is obvious.
Besides K t and Z t , we have an additional state variable t in the set of state variables, so that the value function is given by V (K t ; Z t ; t ). Applying Itô's lemma the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (13) becomes
De…ning y Z =K as before and (y; ) (y; ) V K (K; Z; ), we can repeat the same process as in section 3 and obtain the linear partial di¤erential equation 
The complementary slackness gives the inequality constraint (y; ) P for all (y; ) and dG t > 0 only when (y; ) = P . One can show that the solution to (69) is given in an additive form
where q (y) satis…es
and ( ) satis…es
These two ordinary di¤erential equations together with the smooth-pasting and high-contact conditions leads to the optimal solution of the problem. The challenge of solving this free-boundary problem is left to the readers. Figure 11 illustrates …rm's optimal investment policy. The curve exhibited on this state space of (y; ) gives the trigger boundary, which is the locus of points for which the equality q (y) + ( ) = P holds. The optimality condition requires that the …rm should maintain the shadow price of capital within a range not greater than P . If the current state is to the south-west of this curve, the …rm should not invest in the capital stock and distribute all of the current income as dividends. If the state touches the curve, the …rm should invest immediately. The desired level of capital stock is given by
is some increasing function of t . Let K denote the install capital stock and let Z (K = ( t )) 1 . Then Z t > Z re ‡ects an insu¢ cient capital: The installed capital is too small relative to the …rm's anticipation of the current and future business conditions. The …rm should invest immediately to obtain the desired level of capital stock. On the other hand, when Z t < Z the …rm …nds herself stuck with excessive stock of capital and hence distribute all of the current income to stockholders. It conforms to intuition that the no-investment zone for Z t gets smaller as the anticipated short-run growth rate t increases:
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the theory of investment under irreversibility and costly reversibility can be naturally extended to construct a dynamic theory of …rm's …nancing decisions. "Irreversibility" in our model meant that the …rm may buy back shares but cannot issue new shares. "Costly reversibility" meant that the …rm can issue shares at some cost. We have shown that …nancial frictions force the shadow price of capital to satisfy a second-order ordinary linear di¤erential equation, which is "dual" to the one generated by investment frictions. Although the dual di¤erential equation does not have a closed-form solution, we could characterize the nature of the optimal …nancing policy analytically. We also provided some results which compare the impact of …nancing frictions on investment behavior to that of investment frictions.
We assumed no investment frictions to contrast the role of …nancing frictions to investment frictions. But, since the …rm can buy or sell her capital stock without any frictions in our model, the capital stock got the additional role of providing the vehicle of corporate savings. An obvious extension is to include transactions with banks, i.e., bank savings and borrowings at different rates of interest 20 . A subsequent paper will show how one can extend the present analysis to include these additional spectrum of …nancing.
To Include investment frictions into the model and investigate the interaction between the two would be another topic of interest. Adding …xed and/or nonlinear adjustment cost in …nancing and investment may bring the prediction of the model closer to reality in corporate investment and …nancing dynamics.
Appendix A. Derivation of the solution for the case of irreversible investment
In this appendix we show that the parameters C and y G in (27) should be given by (28), (29), and (30) to satisfy the boundary conditions (21) and (22).
Using (21) and (22), we get
and (1 ) Hy G + HC y
Solving these two equations we …nd
and (29). We further show that (A3) has a simpler expression of (28). Let be a solution to a 0 = cP
1=(1 )
; where c is given by (30).
Appendix B. Derivation of the solution for the case of costly reversible investment
We provide an alternative and more straightforward derivation of the optimal solution for the case of costly reversible investment, which supplements Abel and Eberly (1996) . We know that the general solution to the second-order linear di¤erential equation (20) is given by (24) for y C y y G , where H is de…ned by (25) and 1 , 2 are the roots of the characteristic equation (26) with 1 > 1 and
The constants (C 1 ; C 2 ; y C ; y G ) in q (y) are determined by the four boundary conditions (37) and (38): 
As the …rst step, using (B3) and (B4) we express (C 1 ; C 2 ) as functions of (y C ; y G ). De…ning G y G y C ;
we obtain
which implies
Using (x) we can rewrite C 1 and C 2 as
The conditions (B1) and (B2) then determines y C and y G . Substituting (B8) and (B9), the left-hand-side of (B1) is 
1
(1 )
Thus (B1) reduces to y
The left-hand-side of (B2) is
Using the identities
it is rewritten as
Hence the condition (B2) reduces to
Dividing both sides of (B11) and (B12) generates an equation for G :
Substituting (B8) and (B9) back into (24), we obtain the expression (44) for the shadow price of capital.
Appendix C. Derivation of the di¤erential equation (51)
Taking the partial derivatives of both sides of (50) in K, we get
Using v (K; Z) V K (K; Z) this can be rewritten as
De…ning y Z
1=(1 )
K ;
and letting v (K; Z) q (y), the partial derivatives appearing in (C2) are: which is rewritten as (50).
